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Abstract: Experimental evidence of the effect of providing cheap energy saving technology to 
households is sparse. We present results from a field experiment in which autopoweroff plugs are 
provided free of charge to randomly selected households. We use propensity score matching to find 
treatment effects on metered electricity consumption for different types of households. We find 
effects for single men and couples without children, while we find no effect for single women and 
households with children. We suggest that this could be because of differences in saving potential 
(e.g. some households do not have appliances where using a plug is relevant), differences in the 
skills relevant for installing the technology and differences in the willingness to spend time and 
effort on installation. We conclude that targeting interventions at more responsive households, and 
tailoring interventions to target groups, can increase efficiency of programmes. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Saving energy is on the political agenda, whilst energy saving programs, aimed at reducing 
household energy consumption by providing ‘cheap’ energy saving technology, are becoming 
popular. From the literature it is clear that private power consumers differ substantially in how they 
use electricity and in their ability and willingness to undertake power saving investments and 
change behaviour. Thus, it seems likely that the efficiency of energy saving programs can be 
increased substantially if they are designed for, and targeted at, the most responsive power 
consumers. In this paper, we provide experimental evidence of such programme treatment effects 
that may be used directly as a foundation for the targeting of similar programmes. We also suggest 
explanations for the heterogeneity in consumer responses that we observe which could be helpful 
when designing such targeted programmes.  
There is a substantial literature which studies energy saving behaviour in households whilst 
numerous empirical papers have considered financially demanding long term investments in energy 
reducing technologies (such as energy saving washing machines, dishwashers etc). These studies 
consistently find that the willingness to undertake investments depends on income, age, household 
size and the ownership status of the dwelling, while no significant differences because of gender are 
found in the studies that have investigated this aspect (see e.g. Barr et al. 2005, Long 1983, Mill and 
Schleich 2010b, Sardianou 2003, Young 2008, and e.g. Abrahamse 2005 for a good survey). These 
results are also consistent with financial constraints and time horizons implied by investment 
decisions. 
More relevant for our context, however, is the much smaller literature that investigates consumers’ 
willingness to change habits and undertake energy savings, such as using autopoweroff plugs, or 
choosing energy saving compact florescent light bulbs instead of traditional bulbs (Mills and 
Schleich (2010a), Di Maria et al. (2008), Sardianou (2007) Carlsson-Kanyama (2007), Poortinga et FOI Working Paper 2011 / 10 
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al. (2003) and Scott (1997)). Such “small investments” typically involve purchasing and installing 
the ‘gadget’ and a change of habits requiring time and effort, whereas the financial cost of the 
investment itself is often small. It is this kind of ‘change in habits’ that the above mentioned energy 
saving programmes are designed to induce. Results from this literature are much more inconclusive. 
Some studies find that willingness to change habits depends on income, age, education, and 
household size, but most studies have not found these effects. The only consistent result seems to be 
that the ownership status of the dwellings has no effect. 
Finally, a third strand of literature investigates the effects of providing information feedback to 
households about their own power consumption. Using a field experimental design, Sexton (1989) 
and Matsukawa (2004) estimate the effect of installing continuous-display power-use and cost 
monitors in households on power consumption. Matsukawa (2004) found that the installation of 
power monitors reduced power consumption significantly. Sexton (1989) found that the provision 
of current cost information in a similar setup in which households were subject to time 
differentiated tariffs, caused a significant consumption shift from the peak period to the off-peak 
period. Also using a field experimental design, Gleerup et al. (2010) found that the provision of 
power consumption feedback information through SMS-text messages and email reduced energy 
consumption by 3 %.  
Feedback information on consumption has been studied experimentally and found to be effective, 
presumably because such information induces habit changes. However, the underlying habit 
changes are not identified in these studies and they probably differ substantially between 
households so that they provide little insight into the causes and effects of specific habit changes. 
On the other hand, the prior studies that do investigate specific habit changes e.g. attitude changes, 
changes in the use of autopoweroff plugs, or energy saving compact florescent light bulbs do not 
estimate the resulting power savings. This is our point of departure. In this paper, we present FOI Working Paper 2011 / 10 
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estimates of power savings, which result from habit change induced by the provision of 
autopoweroff plugs. To do this we used a field experimental design in which randomly selected 
households are given an autopoweroff plug and relevant information about how to install and use it 
free of charge. 
Autopoweroff plugs collect jointly used equipment (such as a PC, printer, and modem) in one 
power switch making it much easier for consumers to switch electrical equipment on and off. The 
hope is that this will induce a habit change that will reduce the amount of power that is wasted 
when idle equipment is left on standby mode. The experiment was conducted in Denmark in 2008 
with 748 participating households of which 321 were treated. Treatment consisted of the free 
provision of autopoweroff plugs, together with information on installation and use and the expected 
power saving effect. As the treatment effect we estimate the resulting reduction in metered power 
consumption. The power consumption of households in the treatment and control group is measured 
in both a 2 month pre-treatment and a 2 month post-treatment period. We use propensity score 
matching in a difference in difference setup to find average treatment effects on metered electricity 
consumption for four types of households. We find a substantial effect for single men and couples 
without children (with estimated savings of 5.5% and 5.1% respectively
2), while we find no effect 
for single women and households with children. Our results differ from other studies of habit 
change and energy saving investments, which find no significant differences because of gender. In 
our experiment, we document significant differences between men and women and between 
households with and without children. The use of an experimental design with treatment effects on 
metered power consumption makes us feel confident about the soundness of the results.  
In a post experimental survey to treated participants, just over 25 % of the responding households 
indicated that they had no appliances relevant for installing the plug, while just over 20 % of the 
                                                 
2 Per cent of treated households estimated baseline power consumption without treatment in the post treatment period. FOI Working Paper 2011 / 10 
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responding households indicated that they had already purchased and installed a plug prior to the 
experiment. The survey suggests that there is a substantial unexploited savings potential to be 
gained from using the autopoweroff plug provided in the experiment in all four evaluated groups, 
but also that there are substantial differences in this potential between the four groups. We suggest 
that the main reasons for the substantial differences in treatment effects between groups are 
differences in saving potential (e.g. differences in the diffusion of appliances for which installation 
of the plug is relevant), differences in the skills relevant for installing the provided technology, and 
differences in the willingness to spend time and effort on installation. The explanations we suggest 
are, 1) that younger households have a higher savings potential than older households; 2) that time 
is especially tight in families with children so that they do not allocate the required effort, and; 3) 
that elderly men have greater, technical skills, and interests relevant for auto-plug installation then 
elderly women. We conclude that taking account of these differences when designing similar 
programs in the future could increase program efficiency. More generally, we conclude that the 
evidence based targeting of interventions aimed at inducing energy savings in households can 
significantly increase the efficiency of such programs.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the literature and develops a conceptual 
model of consumer response to such energy savings interventions. The experiment, data and 
estimation approach are described in sections 3 and 4, whilst the results are presented and 
interpreted in sections 5 and 6. In the final section, we conclude and discuss perspectives for 
optimising energy saving interventions and influencing the energy consumption through such 
programs.  
 FOI Working Paper 2011 / 10 
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2. Previous literature and the behavioural framework. 
Studies of investments in energy savings (such as appliances and house insulation) consistently find 
that a number of socio-demographic characteristics have effects that fit well with the time horizon 
and liquidity constraints that such a long term investment problem implies. Such investments are: 
-  positively affected by income that makes investment financing easier (Long, 1993; Mills & 
Schleich, 2010; Poortinga et al., 2003; Young, 2008; Walsh 1989, Scott, 1997); 
-  positively affected by homeownership that ensures ownership of the long term investment 
(Barr et al. 2005; Curtis 1984; Hassett and Metcalf 1995; Scott 1997; Mills and Schleich 
2010b); 
-  negatively affected by age so that reducing time horizons makes long term investments less 
attractive (Carlsson-Kayama and Linden 2007; Sardianou 2007; Walsh 1989; Linden et al., 
2006) and;  
-  positively affected by household size which increases the savings potential of investments 
(Poortinga et al., 2003; Young, 2008).  
Evidence of the effect of education on investments is mixed (Mills and Schleich, 2010b, Scott, 
1997, Curtis, 1984, Poortinga et al., 2003, Sardianou, 2008). Studies which have investigated the 
effect of gender suggest that it is weak or non-existent (Poortinga et al. 2003, Sardianou 2008, 
Carlsson-Kayama and Linden, 2007).  
The adoption of energy saving habits differs from energy saving investments in that habit change is 
driven by the willingness to spend time and effort, whereas investments are driven by financial 
considerations. Results from the studies of habit changes also differ from the results from studies of 
investments:  
-  Dependence on income is weaker. Mills and Schleich (2010a) and Scott (1997) find that 
income has no significant effect on the adoption of low energy light bulbs. Di Maria et al. FOI Working Paper 2011 / 10 
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(2008) find a positive effect, whilst Poortinga et al. (2003) find a negative effect when 
investigating attitudes.  
-  Dependence on age is weaker. Di Maria et al. (2008) and Poortinga et al. (2003) find that 
age has no significant effect on the adoption of energy saving habits, whereas Mills and 
Schleich (2010a) find a positive effect.  
-  No dependence on home ownership is found. Di Maria et al. (2008) and Mills and Schleich 
(2010a) conclude that house ownership makes no impact on the use of low energy light 
bulbs.  
-  There is some evidence to suggest that household size has a positive effect (Mills and 
Schleich, 2010a).  
As with energy saving investments, there is mixed evidence of the effects of education on energy 
saving habits (Mills and Schleich, 2010a, Scott, 1997, Di Maria et al., 2008) and only weak (if any) 
effects of gender (Sardianou, 2007, Di Maria et al., 2008, Carlsson-Kanyama, 2007).  
These differences are not surprising since the adoption of energy saving habits is not a classical 
investment problem. The initiation of habit change is not nearly as financially demanding as 
investments and so one would expect the effect of income to be weaker. One would also expect the 
shorter time span of habit changes to reduce the importance of home ownership and the shorter time 
horizon with age. Given that it is not useful to think of habit change as a classical investment 
problem, the question is what determines how motivated a household is to change habits?  
At the core of the problem faced by households when considering the adoption of energy saving 
habits is presumably uncertainty about the resulting effects on energy consumption and the 
investment in time and effort needed to reduce this uncertainty. Following Mills and Schleich 
(2010a), Di Maria et al. (2008) and others, we see this problem as a two step process. Initially, the 
household is uncertain about the power saving effect of changing habits and considers investigating FOI Working Paper 2011 / 10 
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the option. If the members of the household invest time and effort into investigation, they become 
(more) certain of the outcome. Based on this information, they can decide whether to adopt the 
habit change, or not. Letting U denote net utility of adopting the energy saving habit, we define:  
 
(1 ) ( ) H Us c k T e θ =+ − −      ( 1 )  
 
Where s is the savings potential measured as the monetary value of power saved by the habit 
change,  c is the financial cost associated with the change and  ( ) H Te  is the effort needed to 
implement the habit change. The effort costs of habit change depend on an efficiency parameter e 
(with ' 0 H T < ), which characterises the household’s skills in relation to implementing the habit 
change (e.g. a household with a small e finds it difficult to install and use a autopoweroff plug and 
therefore needs to expend more effort on the task). The parameter k denotes the household’s shadow 
value of effort.
3 If the household has valuable alternative uses of its time and effort (like working or 
caring for children) k is large. The parameter θ  indicates the household’s environmental 
preferences.
4 If  0 θ = , they have no preferences for the environment and they value energy savings 
according to their monetary value, and if  0 θ > , they have environmental preferences and value 
energy savings above their monetary value. After having investigated the problem, the household 
knows U. Presumably, the probability of adopting the energy saving habit depends positively on 
this value i.e.: 
 
                                                 
3 We use the term ‘effort’ rather than ‘time’ to capture the fact that tasks may not only be time consuming as such, but 
also tiring and physically/intellectually demanding. However, nothing essential is lost by using the less abstract concept 
‘time’ instead.  
4 The consumers are expected to potentially have preferences for reducing the environmental effects of their own 
consumption. The value of the parameter θ will therefore differ between types of environmental benefits (water savings, 
gasoline savings, electricity savings, etc.) and over time as the price of the consumption units saved changes. We 
assume that θ is constant for this particular type of environmental benefit, and for this limited period of time. FOI Working Paper 2011 / 10 
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() ( ) P adoption investigation F U =      (2) 
 
The probability of investigating depends negatively on the effort costs of investigating and 
positively on the households’ prior expected net utility. This prior expectation presumably depends 
on actual net utility so we define the probability of investigating as a function of these two 
variables:  
 
() ( , ( ) ) N P investigation G U kT e =      (3)   
 
Where  N T  is the effort required for the investigation (again depending on the household’s efficiency 
parameter  e). Thus, the unconditional probability that a household decides to adopt an energy 
saving habit is (expected signs of partial derivatives are given below the equation):  
 
 
() ( ) ( , ( ) )
                             +       +      -  
N P adoption F U G U kT e =
     (4) 
 
Clearly, households may differ along all the key parameters. For example, if a household has a 
higher savings potential (s)  and lower costs (c) of adoption, the probability of adopting will 
increase. Intuitively, higher environmental preferences (θ ) also increase the probability of 
adopting, whereas a higher cost of effort (k ), or lower skills (e) reduce the probability of adopting. 
Reconsidering the effects of socio-demographic characteristics such as income and age in this light, 
it seems clear that when the strong investment driven financing and time horizon effects disappear, 
what remains are indirect and multifaceted effects of skills, the shadow value of effort and FOI Working Paper 2011 / 10 
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environmental preferences (e.g. the shadow value of effort typically rises with income, but so may 
environmental preferences and technical skills).  
Now consider an intervention I aimed at inducing adoption with the ultimate goal of reducing 
power consumption ( i Y ). Let  ( ) Ii P adoption Δ denote the effect of the intervention on household i’s 
probability of adopting the habit change. The effect we want to induce is energy savings by 
increasing the probability of adoption, as defined in (4). Thus, given a program cost constraint, we 
want to design and target our intervention so as to maximise the expected aggregate power savings 
for the population, i.e. we wish to maximise: 
 
11
() II i I i i
ii
Y Y P adoption s
nn
Δ= Δ= Δ ∑∑       ( 5 )  
in which i is a household indicator and n is the number of households. To maximise the aggregate 
effect, one should target the intervention at households where the intervention is expected to 
produce a large increase in energy savings (i.e. the households with the largest  ( ) Ii i P adoption s Δ ). 
For example, we probably do not want to target households for which the effect of habit change on 
consumption ( i s ) is small, nor do we want to target households that already have a large adoption 
probability, because here the potential probability increase due to intervention is small and many 
may already have adopted the new habit. Instead, it may be more efficient to target households 
which have an adoption probability in the medium range (i.e. households which are ‘close to’ 
undertaking the promoted type of energy savings, but tend not do so on their own). Finally, given 
this we want to design the details of the intervention (how the specific intervention affects s, c, 
() H Te  and  ( ) N Te ) so as to maximise the increases in adoption probability for the targeted 
households. This can be achieved by, e.g. providing the targeted group with the specific types of 
resource that they lack in order to undertake the promoted type of energy savings. For example, if FOI Working Paper 2011 / 10 
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effort use dominates the costs of a specific target group, then it may be more efficient to require 
payment for the provided ‘gadget’ and instead use the limited resources available to develop 
information material and provide a hotline service that could increase households’ efficiency 
parameter (e). If, on the other hand, the effort needed for installation is small compared to the 
monetary costs, then subsidising the provided gadget may be more efficient. With respect to 
questions like these, we can derive little guidance from the previous empirical literature. In this 
paper, we provide some initial insights into this.  
 
3. The autopoweroff plug experiment and data  
In line with other experimental studies such as Sexton (1989), Matsukawa (2004) and Gleerup et al. 
(2010), the idea of the experiment is to undertake an actual intervention in the field and to estimate 
the resulting average power savings for different subgroups of treated households, as defined in (5).  
To do this, we have to be able to measure the daily power consumption of all participants in the 
experiment. The 1183  participants in the experiment were therefore selected from a pool of 
households who had advanced meters which enabled automated meter reading of households’ daily 
power consumption. All participants were selected from three specific neighbourhoods where the 
dominant main heating source is district and oil heating (the Aarhus suburbs of Højbjerg and Viby 
with a large proportion of detached houses and the Skanderborg city centre with a large proportion 
of apartments
5). We selected the subject pool from specific neighbourhoods (i.e. from a few specific 
apartment complexes and specific roads with detached houses) so as to reduce subject pool 
heterogeneity due to climate, dwelling and lifestyle. The cost of this strategy is that the sample of 
households is not representative of the Danish population, as such. After selection, households from 
                                                 
5 The Viby neighbourhood, from which participants were selected, consists of detached houses and town houses built 
between 1949 and 1967. The Skanderborg neighborhood, from which participants were selected, consists of both rented 
and owner apartments all built between 1964 and 1973. The Højbjerg neighborhood, from which participants were 
selected, consists of detached houses built between 1976 and 1980. FOI Working Paper 2011 / 10 
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each specific neighbourhood randomly allocated to between the treatment group (500 participants) 
and a control group (683 participants). Households in the control group were not contacted, or in 
any other way informed about their participation prior to the experiment. The research team was 
simply given access to metered consumption and existing background data registered by the power 
company for households allocated to the control group. Each household in the treatment group 
received one autopoweroff plug in the mail, along with written information about installation and 
the power cost savings which an average household could expect to achieve if the plug was installed 
and used (see appendix B). Just like for the control group, the research team was given access to 
metered consumption and existing background data registered by the power company. Because this 
method of data acquisition does not give selected participants an option to opt out of the 
experiment, we have no attrition during the experiment and so avoid the self-selection and potential 
bias issues this can generate. After completion of the experiment, we deleted all the observations, 
which exhibited measurement problems with the household’s power meter, those for which the 
household membership had changed during the experiment (in some cases, e.g. a son or daughter 
moved out, whilst in others the whole family moved and another moved in) and households with 
electric heating as their main heating source.
6 We have no reason to suspect that this (unavoidable) 
post experimental selection of the data is correlated with the initial random allocation to treatment 
and control groups. It is highly unlikely that the experience of receiving an autopoweroff plug in the 
mail influences a family’s or family member’s decision to move. It is also (for technical reasons) 
highly unlikely that installation of the plug could somehow influence the functionality of the power 
meter. After this deletion procedure, 321 participants remained in the treatment group and 427 
participants remained in the control group.  
                                                 
6 As noted above, the households in the specific neighbourhoods generally have oil and district heating as their main 
heating source. However, when register data was added after the experiment, 9 households were identified through the 
BBR register as having electrical heating as the main heating source and these observations were deleted.  FOI Working Paper 2011 / 10 
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In addition to the metered power consumption, we obtained data on the age and gender of all 
household members at the metered addresses, the type of dwelling (detached house, town house, 
and apartment), ownership (rental, owner), type of heating system in the dwelling, and postal 
district. Based on the data, the households were divided into four groups on the basis of the type of 
household: single males, single females, couples without children and other households (with 
children or more than two adults) (see the summary description of these groups in table 1).  
Table 1. Summary description of the four treatment groups 












Number of households  139  143  266  200 
Number of persons per household  1  1  2  3.7 
Age of adults
  Younger than 40 
years 
34 %   17 %   9 %  36 % 
Between 40 and 60 
years 
36 %  22 %  34 %  63 % 
Older than 60 years  30 %  60%  57 %  1 % 
Type of 
dwelling  
Apartment  81 %   55 %   13 %   18 %  
Town house  5 %  20 %  16 %  4 % 
Detached house  14 %  25 %  71 %  78 % 
Dwelling 
ownership 
Owner 40  % 
 




District heating  
 
96 %  91 %  86 %  84 % 
1) Singles and couples with children (some households have three or more adults, which we assume are children over 
18 still living at home). 
 
We see that single males are younger than single females. The same applies when comparing 
couples with and without children. When comparing couples with singles; couples own properties 
more often as opposed to renting an apartment.  
Information on energy consumption covers the entire period from the 1
st of January to the 1
st of 
May in 2008 with the autopoweroff plug planned to arrive in the mail on the 28
th of February.
7 
Thus, the metered period covers a pre-treatment period from 1
st January until 28
th February and a 
                                                 
7 The Danish mail service is very stable with close to 100% of the mail arriving within a few days of the planned 
arrival.  FOI Working Paper 2011 / 10 
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post treatment period from 29
th February until 1
st May. Summary statistics on energy consumption 
during the two periods are presented in table 2. 
 
Table 2. Summary of data 









in mean consumption  














All treated  
All untreated  
_______________________ 
321  11.331 6.551 10.044 6.094  
427  9.175 6.665 8.005 5.585 t=-4.412*
_____  _______ _____ _______ _____ ______________________
Single male            
 treated:   40  7.572 6.835 6.541 5.543  
 untreated:  99  4.590 2.963 4.395 2.713 t=-2.660*
Single female         
 treated:   51  5.286 2.348 4.745 2.159  
 untreated:  92  5.904 6.713 5.145 5.506 t=0.799
Couples without children         
 treated:  135  12.187 6.278 10.213   
untreated:  131  10.244 5.116 8.766 4.284 t =-2.762*
Households with children         
Treated  95  14.944 5.246 12.999 5.056  
Untreated  105  15.028 6.003 13.231 4.487 t =0.105
1) t -test of  y x μ μ = , with unknown but unequal variance ( υ degrees of freedom)
8,* indicates that the hypothesis 
cannot be rejected at a 5% level.  
 
We see that the average consumption declines in all treatment groups between the pre and post 
treatment periods. However, consumption also falls in all the control groups which highlights the 
importance of seasonality for power consumption. Further, in many cases, we note that both the 
mean and the variance of pre-treatment power consumption differ between treatment and control 
groups (in some cases substantially). This suggests that despite the randomised allocation process, 
treatment and control groups may not be directly comparable in many cases. Properly taking these 
two potential confounders into account is essential when we estimate the treatment effects. 
                                                 
8 The degrees of freedom are given by 
) 1 /( ) / ( ) 1 /( ) / (
) / / (




y y y x x x
y y x x
n n s n n s
n s n s
, in which nx, ny are sample sizes 




4. Estimation of average treatment effects  
We want to estimate the average effect of the intervention (as defined in equation (5)) on the power 
consumption of the four treatment groups. Ideally therefore, we would like to compare the 
measured average power consumption after treatment of the treated groups with the average power 
consumption that the same households would have had under precisely the same circumstances, but 
without the treatment. Because we do not observe this counterfactual, our problem is to construct a 
counterfactual for each group using the pre-treatment consumption measure and the corresponding 
control group for which we also measure power consumption.  
A classical approach to this estimation problem is to use the so called difference in difference (DID) 
estimator (see, e.g. Angrist and Krueger, 1999, and Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) for a recent 
exposition):  
10 10 () () DID T T C C YY YY τ =−−−      ( 6 )  
in which the first parenthesis is the difference in the average power consumption for the entire 
treatment group between the post treatment ( 1 T Y ) and the pre treatment ( 0 T Y ) periods. The second 
parenthesis is the corresponding difference for the entire control group. Following Imbens and 
Wooldridge (2009), this can be estimated using ordinary least squares regression with the 
specification:  
, 0 1 i i DID i i G Y Y ε τ α + + = −       ( 7 )  
in which i = 1,...,n is a household number indicator and Gi is a dummy which indicates that the 
household received treatment (i.e.  1 = i G  for households in the treated group and  0 i G =  for 
controls). The estimator allows for differences between the two groups’ distributions over FOI Working Paper 2011 / 10 
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household characteristics, but these are assumed to only cause a difference in the level of power 
consumption between the two groups (estimated byα ). The underlying seasonal change between 
the pre and post treatment periods is, on the other hand, assumed to be unaffected by the differences 
between the two groups. If this assumption does not hold, then part of the estimated treatment 
effects should instead be attributed to differences in the groups’ underlying seasonal variation 
caused by differences in their distribution of characteristics. This identifying assumption is critical 
in our case. If two households differ substantially in their level of power consumption at a given 
time, it seems likely that their variations in consumption over the season will also differ. To avoid 
making this critical assumption, we estimate treatment effects using matching techniques. 
Matching of treated and untreated households 
Instead of tackling the problem of distributional differences by making functional assumptions 
about how these differences influence effect measures, matching techniques tackle the problem 
directly by harmonising the two distributions. The basic idea is to take the original treatment and 
controls for which distributions differ, and from these select subsamples that have the same 
distributions over household characteristics.  
In order to do this, we have to observe in the data the household characteristics that influence the 
evaluated effect and which distributions differ between treated and controls. Formally, the 
assumption needed for the identification of the treatment effect using matching techniques is the so 
called unconfoundedness assumption (Imbens, 2004). This assumption states that allocation 
between treatment and control groups is independent of the potential outcome (here power 
consumption) when conditioning on the set of covariates used for matching. In addition, the 
distributions of treated and controls must have common support (i.e. overlap). The condition 
ensures that for any treated household there is a positive probability of finding ‘similar’ (in terms of FOI Working Paper 2011 / 10 
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observed characteristics used for matching) households in the control group. In order to satisfy this 
condition, both treated and untreated units may occasionally have to be deleted from the estimation. 
The matching procedure then ‘reweights’ the observations to ensure the harmonisation of the two 
distributions with respect to the chosen covariates. This is done by choosing pairs of similar 
(matching) households from the treatment and control group respectively for inclusion in the 
subsamples
9 to be compared (see Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008. For a recent overview of methods 
and applications see Heckman and Navarro-Lozano 2004, Sianesi, 2004 and Wren and Storey, 
2002). Formally, this matching estimator is: 
*1 *0 *1 *0 () () MTT CC YY YY τ =−−−     (8) 
in which  *1 T Y , *0 T Y , *1 C Y and  *0 C Y  is the average power consumption for the subsample of the 
treatment and control group selected through the matching process. Thus, the matching estimator is 
the DID estimator applied to subsamples for which distributions have been harmonised through 
matching.  
We use propensity score matching so that households are matched on the likelihood of being treated 
(the propensity score) estimated as a function of the observed underlying household 
characteristics.
10 Our specification of the set of variables, which potentially influence the treatment 
effects that are included in the propensity score model on which we match, is critical. Here, the four 
household types for which we estimate the treatment effects reflect key differences in household 
composition and also, presumably, in the key variables influencing weather and how households 
react to the treatment. Within these groups, the most important cause of differences in the effect of 
treatment is presumably the structure of the household’s power consumption i.e. whether the 
                                                 
9 Subsamples are in the sense that some of the original households may have been deleted. Note, however, that other 
households may be replicated one or more times. 
10 See, e.g. Becker and Ichino (2002) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) for the original contribution, which describes 
this technique.  FOI Working Paper 2011 / 10 
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savings potential is substantial enough to induce the household to use the provided plug. We do not 
observe this directly, but pre-treatment power consumption provides us with a nice indicator. In our 
main estimation model, we only match households on pre-treatment power consumption, which 
implies that we assume that if the remaining observed characteristics (type of dwelling type, 
ownership etc.) influence the treatment effect; it is through their influence on the size and variance 
of power consumption. This does not seem unreasonable, but to check the robustness of the 
assumption, we investigate the sensitivity of the estimation results to the expansion of the set of 
components of the propensity score model. 
We use the ‘radius matching’ technique, which implies that pairs can only be matched if propensity 
scores fall within a predefined neighbourhood of each other. Treatment units, or controls, for which 
no close matches are found, are excluded from the estimation (Ravallion, 2008). A control group 
unit can be replicated and used as matches several times. Compared to other matching techniques, 
radius matching implies that the similarity between the compared treatment and the control groups 
is increased. The disadvantage is that the number of matched pairs is reduced, which reduces the 
statistical efficiency and makes the sample, for which treatment effects are evaluated, less 
representative of the original pool of treated households. We also investigate sensitivity to changes 
in the radius matching criteria. 
 
5. Results  
Table 3 presents the estimated treatment effects for four types of households (single men, single 
women, couples without children living at home and households with children) and the estimates of 
the sensitivity to changes in the propensity score components (the three following rows) and the 
sensitivity to changes in the radius matching criteria (the following four rows). Finally, in the last 
row, we present estimates for the standard difference in difference estimator (without matching). FOI Working Paper 2011 / 10 
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Table 3. Estimated Average treatment effects and sensitivity  
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** indicates that the parameter is statistically significant at a 2.5% level (t>1.960), one-sided test of negative treatment 
effect against null-hypothesis. * indicates significant at a 5 % level. 
1) Only for households with children. 
2) Dwelling types: detached house, town house and apartment. 
3) District heating, Oil heating 
 
In the first row (main model), as our main result we find a significant average treatment effect for 
single males and for couples without children. On the other hand, a negative treatment effect for 
single females and households couples with children is highly insignificant, which suggests that few FOI Working Paper 2011 / 10 
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households in these groups changed their habits, or that the effect on power savings of such habit 
changes is negligible. 
In the following three rows, we present the same matching estimators for expanded subsets of the 
propensity score components (indicated in column 2). This shows the sensitivity of our result to a 
relaxation of the assumption that background variables influence the treatment effect through the 
volume of pre-treatment power consumption. We see that relaxing this assumption only has a minor 
effect on the results. Estimated treatment effects for single males and for couples without children 
continue to be significant or close to significant (and of the same magnitude), while the treatment 
effects for the remaining groups continue to be highly insignificant.  
In the following four rows, we present the original matching estimators, but now for varying values 
of the radius matching criteria. Again, we see that our result is not sensitive to variations in this 
estimation parameter. 
Finally, in the last row, we see that the difference in difference estimators shows the same basic 
pattern as our matching estimators. However, the estimated effect for single males is almost twice 
as large when we do not control for differences in the treatment and control group distributions by 
matching. Thus, if we had not controlled for distributional differences through our matching 
estimator, the results would have been noticeably biased.  
To illustrate the importance of the estimated treatment effects, we present the estimated treatment 
effects in percent of the expected power consumption without treatment in table 4. In the 
parenthesis below, we present the confidence interval of the estimate also in percent of the expected 
power consumption without treatment (the interval is bounded above at zero).  FOI Working Paper 2011 / 10 
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 Table 4. Importance of the estimated effects 
 
 




Effect in % of 
consumption
1): 














2):  -5.5 %*  0.0%  -5.1 %*  0.0% 









-225 kWh * 
 
0 kWh 
1) Estimated effects in percent of estimated average post-treatment power consumption of treated households 
2) Average Treatment Effect. 
* indicates that the average treatment effect is significant at a 5 % level. 
 
We see that the estimated power reduction in the two groups with significant treatment effects is 
150 kWh and 225 kWh respectively, which is over 5 % of power consumption in both cases. This is 
an effect within the ballpark of what one would expect.
11 For the two groups with insignificant 
treatment effects, the estimation upper bounds (97.5 percentile) suggest that we can be fairly 
confident that the savings in households with children are close to zero (and at any rate substantially 
smaller than for couples without children: the statistical test of this is highly significant p=0.995, 
two-sample t-test unequal variances). The confidence band for single females is wider, so we cannot 
rule out that there may, in fact, be a noticeable treatment effect for this group. However, it is 
significantly smaller than the effect for both single males and couples without children.
12 
 
6. Discussion  
In this section, we discuss reasons why the estimated treatment effects differ between the four 
                                                 
11 A large Danish engineering study has calculated that the average power saving of installing the plug for a Danish 
household is 160 kWh (www.elboligmodel.dk), which is within the confidence interval of both estimates. 
12 P(smaller)= 0.9707 and 0.9820 respectively, two-sample t-tests unequal variances. FOI Working Paper 2011 / 10 
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treatment groups using the behavioural model presented in section two to structure our discussion.  
One obvious reason for not using a plug received in the mail is that there is a low saving potential 
either because the household has no installations where the plug is relevant, or because the 
household already has a plug installed. Very few Danish households do not have appliances with a 
stand-by function (such as TVs, stereos and PC -equipment). However, one possible explanation for 
not using a plug that is received through the mail is if a household already has such a plug installed. 
We sent a post treatment questionnaire to all treated households after the measurement period (see 
appendix A). The response rate was low (only about 20%) and the households who used or actively 
considered using the plug are probably over represented, while the households who did not read the 
instructions or investigate the possible uses of the plug, are probably under-represented. Virtually 
none of the responding couples with children said that they had no installations where the plug is 
relevant. This suggests that most families with children have appliances with a stand-by function 
(such as TVs, stereos and IT-equipment) which seems plausible. For single women and couples 
without children, 45 % and 34 % respectively said that they have no installations where the plug is 
relevant (the difference is not significant
13). These two groups are older than singles males and 
households with children and it also seems reasonable that a substantial part of these households do 
not have such installations. However, most households in these groups still have such equipment. 
Of those responding, between 9 % and 30 % indicated that they had already installed a plug prior to 
the experiment where the highest percentages were found for single males and couples without 
children. This suggests that there is a considerable savings potential among respondents to the 
survey in all four groups. The survey respondents are probably more motivated to save power and 
have therefore probably with greater probability already installed an autopoweroff plug of their own 
accord compared to non-respondents. Thus, it seems safe to conclude that there is a sizable 
                                                 
13 P(difference=0)=0.3563, two-sample t-test unequal variances. 
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technical potential for power saving from by installing the provided plugs in all four groups, but 
that this potential may be substantially smaller in the older groups: single women and couples 
without children.  
Presumably the fact that a power plug and information about its power saving effect arrives in the 
post dramatically reduces the investigation costs for all households (equation 3) who have not 
previously investigated the option, since they no longer have to seek out information about the 
power saving effect of the plug, its purchasing cost or where it can be purchased. Assuming that the 
treatment reduces investigation costs to close to zero, the decision problem that households face is 
whether to install the plug and adopt the new habit, conditional on having investigated the 
possibility. This is captured by equation (9), which indicates the probability of adoption conditional 
on a household having investigated the option:  
 
() ( ( 1 ) ( ) ) H P adoption investigation F s c kT e θ =+ − −     ( 9 )  
 
In which we recall that s is the monetary value of power saved by the habit change, c is the 
monetary costs associated with the habit change,  ( ) H Te  is the effort cost of the habit, e is the 
household’s implementation ability and skills (with  ' 0 H T < ), whilst the parameter θ  indicates the 
household’s environmental preferences (if  0 θ =  the household has no preferences for the 
environment and values energy savings according to their monetary value. If  0 θ > , the household 
has environmental preferences and values energy savings above their monetary value).  
In addition to reducing the investigation costs to zero, our experimental treatment also reduces the 
monetary costs of the habit change (c) to zero for all households. Thus, the remaining possible 
explanations for differences in the average treatment effects between the four groups is differences 
in the distribution of potential savings (s), environmental preferences (θ ), implementation ability FOI Working Paper 2011 / 10 
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(e) and alternative costs of effort (k) between the four groups. 
From table 1 and 2 above, in which the key characteristics of the groups are summarised, we know 
that single males (with a significant treatment effect) are younger and have a somewhat larger level 
of power consumption than single females (who do not react to the treatment). Part of the 
explanation for the different reactions to the treatment is probably that the savings potential is 
greater for males, because they have more of the relevant installations without already having 
installed the plug. We cannot rule out that a difference in environmental preferences is also part of 
the explanation. On the other hand, the fact that younger males are probably more active on the 
labour market means that their cost of effort is probably greater, which would tend to reduce the 
probability that they will react.
14 Another possible explanation for this could be differences in 
technical skills. Carlsson-Kayama and Linden (2007) note that household tasks are not equally 
distributed between males and females in most households. While females spend more time on 
household chores, men typically spend more time on maintenance tasks. In Denmark, this may not 
apply to younger generations where male and female labour market participation is the same and 
where more equal task sharing in the home is increasingly becoming the norm. However, it may 
apply to older generations. Understanding the installation instructions and undertaking the actual 
installation of the autopoweroff plug may be a typical male task, at least amongst older generations, 
and this may be why households without a male do not react. In our model, older males may, on 
average, have a larger efficiency parameter (e) prior to treatment than older females. This 
explanation is supported by the fact that couples without children (who like single women are older 
and have a substantial proportion of questionnaire respondents who say that they have no 
installations for which the plug is relevant) react to treatment, while single women do not.  
Based on this, we would expect couples with children to react to the treatment as they have 
                                                 
14 For example, Mills and Schleich (2010b) argue that retirees/elderly have more free time and are therefore more 
willing to spend time on energy reducing habit changes. FOI Working Paper 2011 / 10 
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substantially larger power consumption and their questionnaire answers suggest that their potential 
for power savings (s) is greater than it is for single males and couples without children, whilst they 
have the necessary technical skills (e), since a male is part of the household. Once again, we cannot 
rule out the possibility that the reason that couples with children do not react, while couples without 
do, is because of differences in environmental preferences, although we think this is unlikely. 
Rather, we suspect that the explanation is a substantial difference in the average alternative costs of 
effort (k) between the two groups. Households without children are substantially older and probably 
less active on the labour market and so, as suggested by Mills and Schleich (2010b), probably have 
lower alternative costs of time and effort. This difference is reinforced by the presence of children 
who are typically given a high priority by working parents when allocating their sparse free time. 
To sum up, we suspect that the differences in reactions to the treatment that we observe are due to:  
-  A difference in the average savings potential between groups mainly due to a difference in 
household appliances. 
-  A difference in the average implementation skills between older men and older women and 
possibly a difference in how our information regarding installation affects these skills. 
-  A difference in the alternative costs of time due to labour market participation and children. 
If the above are true, then in addition to focusing interventions on responsive groups the study 
indicates how interventions might be adapted to increase effectiveness in responsive groups, as well 
as in non-responsive groups, if these are to be targeted. For example, if the installation is in fact 
performed by men in older households with men, then the instructions and information material sent 
to these households could possibly be made more effective if developed and written with this target 
group in mind. If, on the other hand, older single women are to be targeted, a very different 
information approach might be necessary – perhaps a hot line. If the high alternative cost of time 
does in fact explain why there is no effect on households with children, targeting these families may FOI Working Paper 2011 / 10 
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not be worthwhile unless a very time efficient installation strategy can be devised. 
 
7. Conclusion  
The provision of cheap energy saving technology to households could be an effective means to 
induce energy saving habit changes. In this paper, we present results from a randomised Danish 
experiment, which measured the actual power savings resulting from habit change induced by 
providing households with an autopoweroff plug. We find substantial effects for single men (5.5 % 
of power consumption) and couples without children (5.1 % of power consumption) while we find 
no, or only a small, effect for single women and households with children. Our experimental design 
without attrition, the estimation of effects on metered power consumption and our estimation’s 
robustness to changes in the estimation approach, make us feel confident about the soundness of the 
results. 
The significant differences due to gender and between households with and without children are in 
contrast to prior studies of habit change and energy saving investments. The estimated treatment 
effects for the responding groups are sizable compared to the cost of the provided plug technology. 
The differences in effects between groups could be of use to policy makers who are considering 
how to target similar interventions.  
We consider it unlikely that the differences in reactions to treatment can be completely explained by 
differences in prior installation of plugs across the groups. We speculate that important reasons for 
these differences include a difference in savings potential between the groups (because the diffusion 
of appliances for which use of the plug is relevant differs), differences in the allocation of time and 
effort (because of different shadow costs of time and effort) and differences in technical skills and 
interest. Specifically, we suggest three possible explanations: 1) that the savings potential 
(appliances for which it is relevant to use the plug) is smaller for older households, 2) that older FOI Working Paper 2011 / 10 
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women on average possess less of the required technical skills and interest for successful 
installation than older men and, 3) the time constraint is especially tight for working families with 
children and so they did not allocate the required effort. In contrast, both single males and childless 
couples have both the necessary skills and available time for successful installation. We conclude 
that taking account of such differences when designing similar programs in the future could 
increase program efficiency. However, though the specific explanations we suggest are plausible 
and consistent with our post experimental questionnaire and other findings in the literature, our 
response rate is low. Thus, we cannot support our suggested explanations with strong empirical 
evidence from our experiment, although they provide a potential starting point for future research. 
More generally, it seems that evidence based targeting and the design of interventions aimed at 
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Number of treated households in 
the experiment 
40 51  139  97 
Number and share of households 









Share of households installing the 
plug 
70 %  45 %  55%  81 % 
Reasons for not installing the plug:      
- Do not have the time, share  0% 5% 9%  13% 
- Not interested, share   0% 0% 0% 0% 
- It is too difficult, share   10% 5%  2%  0% 
- No appliances for which it is 
relevant, share 
20% 45  % 34%  6% 
Share of households which already 
have a plug installed 
30 %  9%  25 %  9% 
Share of households which have 
previously considered buying an 
autopoweroff plug  




APPENDIX B: Information on the autopoweroff sent to households.  
 
 
Standby Saver track 
Your shortcut to save energy that would otherwise be used on standby 
without changing habits 
 
Standby energy uses approximately 10% electricity of the household. TV sets and computers uses for approximately 
1000 DKK a year on Standby energy in the household. With Standby Saver track you can remove Standby energy on all 
types of devices and appliances. 
 
How does the Standby Saver Work? 
 
You have to choose the most used electrical device for instance The Television. Place the plug in the “Master” socket 
and other devices such as DVD and/or satellite receivers etc. in to the 'accessories' socket. When you turn off the TV - 
or put it on standby – the other connected devices will automatically switch off. The opposite happens when you turn on 
the TV again. 
 
Any electrical device can be used as the 'master'. When you turn off this device the power supply automatically turn off 
to the other four sockets. Video or other devices that should not be turned off should be plugged in to the 'permanent' 
socket. 
 
How much can you save? 
 
The savings depends on how much that is connected to the Standby Saver track also model and age of the appliances 
and how many hours you use it daily. On average there is a saving on 250, - DKK per year per Standby Saver track 
Check the power consumption of your appliances with a SparOmeter (power measurer) that you can borrow at the 
library. It reveals both in watts and DKK, how much standby measures. 
 
On www.lokalenergi.dk you can find other tips on how to minimize your home energy consumption. If you have any 
questions please call your Local Energy's Consultants in Energy Advice on phone number: xx xx xx xx. 